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Abstract: The corporation has undergone a fundamental change over the last few 
decades from an organisation with predominantly tangible assets, such as buildings 
and equipment, to the ‘mindful corporation’ with intangible assets, such as brands, 
patents and reputations. While the corporation has made immense contributions to 
economic prosperity and development, it is also associated with growing levels of 
income and social inequality. To correct its deficiencies and restore trust, it needs to be 
reinvented for the 21st century. It should be reconceived as a means of commitment to 
the promotion of the interests of its customers and communities as well as enhancing 
the wealth of its investors. This requires a careful reconsideration of the purpose of 
the corporation and its associated forms of ownership and governance. The  humanities 
have a vital role to play in achieving this.
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PART 1—WHERE WE ARE
Hesiod had four of them, Ovid five of them and Shakespeare seven of them. ‘All the 
world’s a stage and all the men and women merely players. They have their exits and 
entrances and one man in his time plays many parts his acts being seven ages.’ The 
seven ages of man. ‘At first the infant mewling and puking in the nurse’s arm. Then 
the whining schoolboy with satchel and shining morning face, creeping like snail 
unwillingly to School.’1 All very politically incorrect; much safer to stick to the 
corporation.
There we find six ages. At first the merchant trading company established by royal 
charter to undertake voyages of discovery and promote commerce around the world. 
Then the public corporation created by Acts of Parliament to engage in major public 
1 William Shakespeare ‘All the World’s a Stage’, As You Like It, Act II, Scene VII.
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works and the building of canals and railways. Then, with freedom of incorporation 
in the 19th century, the private corporation emerged—the seedbed of the industrial 
revolution and the manufacturing corporation. Next came the service firm and the 
rise of the financial institution. The fifth age was the transnational corporation put-
ting a girdle around the earth and running rings around national governments. Last 
scene of all that ends this strange eventful history is the mindful corporation—sans 
machines, sans man, sans money, sans everything.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of the market value of US corporations attribut-
able to tangible assets—plant, machinery and buildings—as against intangibles—
licences, patents and research developments. It records that intangibles today account 
for 80 per cent of the market value of US corporations whereas just 40 years ago 
tangibles accounted for 80 per cent of stock market values.
Figure 2 shows that the millennium was a turning point when for the first time 
investment in intangibles exceeded that in tangibles in the UK. We might once have 
been a nation of shopkeepers, buildings and office blocks—lots of office blocks—but 
no more. The turn of the millennium marked the turn of Britain into a nation of 
brands and brains.
A particularly striking feature of this graph is the area in blue—the financial 
 crisis—when tangible investment took a nosedive but not intangibles. Our brands and 
brains were more resilient than our buildings and office blocks and they have marched 
on since then.
Figure 1. The proportion of the market value of US corporations attributable to tangible assets as 
against intangibles.  (Source: Ocean Tomo LLC.)
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Figure 2. Comparison of investment in intangibles and tangibles over time in the UK. (Source: Goodridge 
et al. 2014.)
Figure 3. Comparison of investment in intangibles and tangibles over time in the US. (Reproduced with 
permission from: Nakamura 2009.)
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As you might expect, what Britain does, the US does better (Figure 3). There too 
the turn of the century marked the turn of the US from manufacturing to minds and 
while intangibles account for around 6 per cent of GDP in the UK, they are around 
9 per cent of GDP in the US.
Reliance on intangibles might feel like placing one’s faith in magic; an economy of 
magicians not manufacturers making nothing but air—the weightless economy. But it 
is no such thing. The sixth age of the corporation marks the most remarkable period 
of our existence. It is indeed a corporation sans machines, sans man, sans money, sans 
everything.
Take Facebook and its founder Mark Zuckerberg as examples. In 2008, Mark 
Zuckerberg made a very costly decision when he failed to employ two people who had 
recently left Yahoo!. Instead the two went to the Red Rock Café in Mountain View, 
California to write computer code on laptops perched on wobbly tables. It was the 
code for sending messages on cellphones in a cheaper and more reliable form than 
either SMS or MMS. In October 2009, they raised $250,000 from five ex-Yahoo! 
friends.
The two people were Brian Acton and Jan Koum and the company they formed 
was called WhatsApp, which last year they sold to Facebook for $19 billion. Instead 
of employing Acton and Koum for a few thousand dollars back in 2008, Mark 
Zuckerberg ended up buying their corporate form for $19 billion.
This story is made all the more remarkable by the fact that this was a company 
with not just no machines, no men and no money—it was burning money. In the six 
months prior to the purchase, WhatsApp made a loss of $230 million. What was 
Mark Zuckerberg thinking when he purchased a loss-making company with no assets, 
no people and lots of liabilities for $19 billion? Was Mark a magician or mad?
The mindful corporation is an extraordinarily efficient concept. The creation of a 
corporation worth $19 billion on the back of an idea that involves few people, a hand-
ful of computers, little space and next to no capital stands in marked contrast to the 
previous ages of the corporation with their fleets of sailing ships, hoards of labourers, 
belching factories, teams of service providers, and gleaming transnational headquar-
ters of far-flung corporate empires. They have given way to the mindful corporation.
At the same time as it is an elegant culmination of a process that has been in prog-
ress for 600 years, the mindful corporation also embodies the problems that have 
steadily been emerging. On 19 August 2004, Google came to the NASDAQ stock 
market at a share price of $85 per share in an initial public offering that valued the 
company at more than $23 billion. Today the founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page are 
each valued by Forbes at $29 billion.
But Google not only exemplifies the extraordinary concentration of wealth that 
the mindful corporation is creating, which by comparison puts the tens of millions of 
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dollars of annual income earned by investment bankers into the poverty category, it 
also illustrates another form of concentration: concentration of power. When Google 
came to the stock market, it issued two classes of shares—one class that was made 
available to the public at large and another class that was just held by the founders. 
The latter had 10 times the voting control of the former. As a result, today Sergey Brin 
and Larry Page have complete control of Google with a majority of the votes.
This ownership structure was deemed by many analysts and investors at the time 
to be a violation of good corporate governance and a threat to the ordinary investor. 
Today in November 2015 the share price is $750, an increase of nearly nine-fold from 
flotation—not bad for a period during which the S&P index has only approximately 
doubled. In this case at least, concentration of power does not appear to have acted to 
the detriment of its investors. Other social media companies, such as Facebook and 
LinkedIn, and Internet companies, such as Alibaba, also came to the stock market 
with dual-class share structures that allowed their founders and partners to retain 
control.
But whether the concentration of ownership and power acts to the detriment of 
society more generally is a moot issue. Concentration of wealth may be fully justified 
by the enormous contributions that the founders have made to our lifestyles and 
well-being; and retention of voting control may be required, as the founders claim, to 
preserve their corporations’ clarity of vision and purpose. But have no illusions—the 
mindful corporation is creating extraordinary disparities of wealth and power in the 
hands of those with the minds to create them that make the landed gentry of the past 
look like impoverished downtrodden farmers.
This is the latest in a long progression of changes to the role of the corporation in 
contemporary society during its six ages of existence. At the outset it was a public 
agent—an instrument of the king and then Parliament to promote the national 
 interest in building an empire and then the infrastructure on which we rely to this day.
With freedom of incorporation in 1844, the stranglehold of the state was relaxed 
and families controlled its development. However, it remained firmly rooted in and 
dependent on the nation state. Even when it grew into major manufacturing industry 
and families ceded control, it was dependent on the state for its prosperity. But with 
the emergence of, first, the multinational and, then, the transnational corporation, 
which is not only international but stateless, the corporation has become footloose.
Not only has it become footloose, it is also timeless. Kings and parliaments 
 provided a permanence and durability to the purpose of the firm. This was then 
adopted by families that passed corporations through several generations of  owners—
such as the Barclays and the Cadburys. As families relinquished control to outside 
investors, ownership was initially retained by individual investors, the euphemistic 
widows and orphans, for extended periods of time but then transferred to institutions 
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that have held them for progressively shorter periods of time as portfolios of assets to 
be traded at will, a phenomenon that has been observed around the world (Figure 4).
So from entities with persistent ownership beholden to their nation states, 
 corporations have transitioned into organisations with investors with no commitment 
to any particular nation or generation other than the present. The result is that the 
interests of the corporation have progressively diverged from those of the societies 
within which they operate.
Much of what we observe in terms of both flourishing and failures of societies 
around the world is attributable to the way in which the corporation has evolved. The 
remarkable growth of China, India, Japan, Korea and Singapore in the post-WW2 
period has come on the back of the emergence of corporations owned by the state in 
China, by banks and other corporations in Japan, and families in India, Korea and 
Singapore. The failure of Africa and the Middle East to demonstrate similar  flourishing 
reflects an absence of indigenous corporate sectors and over-reliance on foreign 
 subsidiaries. The problems that have recently emerged in Asian economies of 
 environmental pollution in China, of growing levels of income inequality in India, of 
monopoly distortions in Korea, and of conflicts in bank–firm relations in Japan are 
attributable to failures of their corporate sectors.
Figure 4. Average holding periods of shares on six stock exchanges. (Source: reproduced from Haldane 
2010.)
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Closer to home the widening disparities of income within corporations between 
executives at the top and employees on the shop floor can be attributed to the  changing 
nature of the corporation. So too can the disparities in wealth between those who own 
and control corporations and the rest of society and the failure of governments to be 
able to raise tax from highly profitable transnational corporations. So too can the 
breakdown in trust in the financial sector where the interests of shareholders and 
executives have diverged from those of their customers and creditors.
That a single organisational form can perform so many different functions from 
the one-man enterprise to the corner shop to the conglomerate, from social enterprise 
to manufacturing to public infrastructure, from the no-tech to the low-tech to the 
high-tech is truly remarkable. That the corporation can explain the growth of nations 
around the world and the failure of others to progress is indicative of its macro-
economic significance. That the different nature of the corporation is associated with 
social benefits and ills and its changes over time with their emergence and eradication 
suggests that it is to the corporation that we should turn for the source of both our 
prosperity and our impoverishment.
The fact that the corporation has become footloose and timeless could be a source 
of tremendous well-being that frees it from the political constraints and historical 
conventions to which we are currently subject. To the economist the combination of 
well-functioning competitive and complete markets together with well-governed 
 corporations that pursue the wealth of their shareholders is the source of economic 
prosperity.
With the emergence of the mindful corporation we could therefore be on the edge 
of the most remarkable prosperity and creativity in the history of the world. On the 
other hand, we could equally well be at the mercy of corporations that are the seeds 
of our destruction through growing inequality, poverty and environmental  degradation 
that give rise to social disorder, national conflicts and environmental collapse on scales 
that are almost impossible to conceive of today. We are therefore on the border 
between creation and cataclysm and the corporation is in large part the determinant 
of which way we will go.
Our future therefore depends on reinventing the corporation for its seventh and 
final age. But describing what it will take to get us to nirvana rather than into a 
 collapsing supernova, we first need to look backwards to understand where are and 
how we got here to the cusp of nirvana and supernova.
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PART 2—HOW WE GOT HERE
The intellectual history of the corporation is one of benign neglect that lagged far 
behind the emergence of economics from the age of enlightenment. To the extent that 
the joint-stock corporation was discussed, it was largely to suggest that it should not 
exist. For Adam Smith, specialisation of labour was a source of economic prosperity, 
but the corporation was infested with conflicts of interest between management and 
shareholders to the point that ‘negligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
 prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.’ 2
It was the market and exchange rather than the corporation that was the source of 
economic prosperity. Even for Alfred Marshall—the grandfather of industrial 
 economics writing more than a hundred years later—the existence of the corporation 
rested precariously on the integrity of the English gentleman. ‘It is a strong proof of 
the marvellous growth in recent times of a spirit of honesty and uprightness in 
 commercial matters, that the leading officers of great public companies yield as little 
as they do to the vast temptations to fraud which lie in their way.’3
It was not until Ronald Coase writing in the 1930s that the corporation was given 
a more solid foundation as an alternative lower cost way of organising economic 
activity than the marketplace.4 Once one thinks of the corporation in these terms then 
it clearly takes on a relevance of its own as a legitimate subject of study and from this 
sprang the intellectual underpinnings of business school education and scholarship.
But what continued to dominate economic analysis of the corporation was 
 precisely the issue that had concerned Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall—its 
 dependence on managers who at best were negligent and at worst fraudulent.5 Since it 
is the shareholders who bear the cost of  their managements’ negligence and frauds, 
it is the shareholders who should have the right to prevent them from engaging in such 
malpractices. With the risk of failure goes the right to govern the corporation, and 
shareholders should have ownership rights to elect, remove and reward  management—
corporate governance.6
The only problem with this elegant solution was whether shareholders would exer-
cise those rights. So long as the shareholder was the founder of the firm, or a family, 
then the answer was yes. But if  the shareholder was one amongst many institutional 
2 Smith (1776), Book V, Chapter 1.
3 Marshall (1892), Book IV, Chapter 12.
4 Coase (1937).
5 See, for example, Alchian & Demsetz (1972) and Jensen & Meckling (1976).
6 Friedman (1970) and Hansmann & Kraakman (2001).
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investors as we have today, then the answer is no. Shareholders might have the rights, 
but they do not have the incentives or knowledge to exercise them.7
It is this failure of governance with which all the ills of the corporation today are 
associated. Two hundred and fifty years after Adam Smith first identified the problem, 
we are still trying to grapple with it. The joint-stock corporation should not have 
existed, but not only have we allowed it to but we have encouraged it to become the 
most important institution in our lives and we are paying the price for it.
So looking through an economic lens, nearly all policy towards the corporation 
has been concerned with solving this one issue of how to make management more 
accountable to their shareholders. A recent front cover of The Economist proclaimed 
‘capitalism’s unlikely heroes’ to be the hedge fund activists who strike terror into the 
boards of public corporations by purchasing blocks of shares in companies and then 
demanding seats on their boards with a view to shaking up and shaking out their 
 negligent if  not fraudulent management.8 They are the new corporate raiders—the 
Carl Icahns and the Lord Hansons of the 2010s—the heroes of The Economist’s 
 capitalism who will bring us to our state of nirvana.
In fact, the new corporate raiders will bring us no more happiness than their 
 predecessors. There is some irony in the conclusion that markets for corporate control 
are needed to ensure that activities are undertaken more efficiently in corporations 
than in product markets. This reductionist conclusion brings the corporation back to 
its primordial market form and once again we end up bereft of a theory of it.
The reason for this conceptual failure is that the intellectual basis of the  corporation 
from Adam Smith to the present is fundamentally wrong. The defect of the  corporation 
is not its lack of accountability of management to its shareholders or the failure of 
shareholders to exercise their rights of control. On the contrary, these are the very 
attributes of the corporation that make it into such a remarkable and valuable 
institution.
Why? Three reasons: contract and market incompleteness, unenforceability, and 
infeasibility. Let me unpack this economic and legal jargon. The idea that share-
holders bear the risks and rewards of the corporation rests on the notion that  everyone 
else—we as employees, customers and creditors—are protected by contracts that 
ensure that we are paid, supplied and repaid. Only shareholders do not have contracts 
that ensure that they are paid a dividend or can claim their money back. Once invested, 
a shareholding in a firm becomes its permanent capital that cannot be claimed back 
and only sold to others through, for example, stock markets. So shareholders as a 
group are exceptionally exposed to the fortunes of the firm.
7 Fama & Jensen (1983).
8 The Economist, 7 February 2015.
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But that rests on the assumption that we as employees, communities and creditors 
are protected by contract. As employees in the Cadbury factory in Somerdale dis-
covered when Cadbury was taken over by Kraft in 2010, or employees in the  sweatshops 
in Bangladesh endured when they erupted into infernos, or citizens of Beijing 
 experienced when inhaling pollution on a daily basis, contracts are very restricted. 
And as nations and taxpayers discovered during the financial crisis, even if  contracts 
exist, they are often not enforceable if  the borrowers—the banks in this case—do not 
have the money to repay them.
Most seriously of all, there are many for whom contracts and markets are simply 
irrelevant. They are not relevant in much of the developing world and those living in 
the slums of Kibera. They are not even conceivable for future generations who do not 
have a voice let alone a contract to protect them from the destruction of what should 
be their—as much as our—rain forests and environment.
Shareholders are not therefore by any means the only party exposed to the mis-
fortunes of corporations and the more that we strengthen the rights and powers of 
shareholders, the more we threaten the interests of others. The Somerdale plant was 
closed by Kraft, the acquirer of Cadbury; Western corporations scouring the earth for 
lowest cost suppliers sustain the sweatshops of the world; and banks sell inappro-
priate financial products to make money at the expense of, not for the benefit of, 
others.
So long as the corporation is viewed as just an instrument of its shareholders then 
these problems will become worse and bring us to a point of social, political and 
 environmental catastrophe. But the solution is not simply to transfer control to 
another party—employees, customers or the state. That merely creates other  problems. 
Mutual organisations owned by their employees or customers are unable to raise 
 substantial amounts of capital and therefore operate in low capital industries such as 
retailing and wholesaling. Publicly owned corporations are bureaucratic, inefficient 
and distorted by conflicting political influences.
Most seriously of all, control by employees, customers, the state or shareholders 
comes at the expense of the party which is not represented at all—future generations. 
Mutual organisations demutualise to allow current generations of customers and 
employees to benefit at the expense of future generations. Founders of mindful 
 corporations capitalise the future value of the entities that they create through initial 
public offerings. Hedge funds extract the capital value of corporations they target by 
seeking higher dividend payouts and repurchases of shares. In other words, the 
 securitisation of corporations has converted them into rent-extraction vehicles for 
benefiting current at the expense of future generations of owners.
What makes the corporation so remarkable is that it has the power to do the 
 opposite—to be our saviour and source of social as well as economic well-being— 
provided that we recognise that our intellectual conception of it is fundamentally 
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wrong and that the separation of its control by management from its ownership by 
shareholders or its control by other parties is its attribute not its deficiency.
How can this be so? The law recognises that the corporation is a legal personality 
distinct from its shareholders. Its directors owe a fiduciary responsibility to the 
 members of the corporation who are in general its shareholders but in so doing the 
directors may legitimately uphold the interests of many other parties—its employees, 
creditors, customers and communities. The directors can and should balance the 
interests of different parties in pursuit of the prosperity of the corporation. And the 
owners should ensure that the corporation pursues its long-term not just its  immediate 
prosperity, which may, as the Court of Delaware, the leading jurisdiction over US 
corporations, has reaffirmed on several occasions, involve forgoing short-term for 
long-term shareholder returns.
But the delicate balance between the interests of different parties and generations 
is jeopardised by an excessive focus on shareholder returns or stakeholder interests. 
While the law permits and even encourages directors to uphold the well-being of  others, 
the market for corporate control and the hedge fund activists make it  increasingly 
 difficult for them to do so. That is why nearly every country in the world, with the 
exception of the UK, protects management through long-term stable  shareholders, 
takeover defences and board structures that impede the replacement of management.
It is through the separation of management and long-term owners from their 
shareholders that the corporation is able to commit first and foremost to its purpose 
in delivering the largest social networks, the best Internet search engines, the cheapest 
washing machines or the most reliable cars. To deliver this purpose it commits to 
many different parties, including but not exclusively its shareholders, and to future 
generations as well as to the present. And it is this notion of the corporation as a 
remarkable instrument of commitment rather than contract or control that has been 
missing from our conception of the corporation. It is the power to commit to its 
 purpose and to different parties to different degrees in the delivery of that purpose 
that makes the corporation such a powerful institution.
There is nothing wrong in capitalising future rents to the benefit of current 
 generations, and there may be considerable advantages in so doing to establish strong 
incentives for wealth creation, provided that this does not come at the expense of, and 
preferably to the benefit of, future generations of customers, employees, communities 
and society. As a commitment vehicle, the corporation is exceptionally well placed to 
achieve that; as an instrument of control it is not.
Why have we failed to recognise this until today? The answer is that the failings of 
the corporation have not until recently been so manifest. Adam Smith was writing in 
the second age of the corporation when it was still a public instrument of Parliament. 
So while he recognised the potential for the corporation to do damage, it was not the 
central concern of his time. By the time we get to the third age and Alfred Marshall, 
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the corporation was owned by families and then individuals who in many cases, such 
as the Cadburys, Rowntrees, Colmans, Ricketts, Boots and Beechams were people of 
high integrity and social conscience. It is as we move to the fourth age of the rise of 
the financial institution, the fifth age of the transnational corporation and the sixth 
age of the mindful corporation that the power to defraud, destroy and exploit become 
all too evident.
But while the mind of the corporation is remarkably nimble, the mind of man is 
not always so. We cling on to intellectual paradigms far beyond their sell-by date. ‘All 
truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed 
and third it is accepted as being self-evident.’9 As The Economist article illustrated, we 
are currently between stages one and two. The problem with accepting the normal rate 
of progression to stage three is that time is extraordinarily short and by then the 
 damage that will have been done may be irreversible.
So before it is too late, let me then turn to what we need to do to reinvent the 
 corporation for its seventh age—an age of what should be recreation not cremation—
the age of the trusted corporation.
PART 3—THE TRUSTED CORPORATION
The three key determinants of the corporation are purpose, ownership and  governance. 
If  the purpose of the corporation is just to make profits, then we are sunk. That is not 
the purpose of the corporation—it is not what it has been, it is not what it needs to be 
and it is not what it should be going forward.
The purpose of the corporation is to do things—to make goods and services that 
benefit us as customers and communities. The corporation should have a real interest 
in the welfare and well-being of its employees. These products and processes then 
produce profits. Profits are the product of the purpose of the corporation; they are not 
its purpose per se.
All the most successful corporations know and do this. But what is much less well 
understood is how to do it and what it takes for those companies that are not doing it 
to do it. Some believe that they only have to say it in mission and corporate social 
responsibility statements and it will happen. That has no plausibility; the tough part 
is committing to an extent that it becomes irreversible—only then is it credible.
Some of  the most successful corporations in the world do exactly that. Examples 
are Bertelsmann the media company, Bosch the automotive supply company, 
9 This quotation is often attributed to Arthur Schopenhauer, but there is no known citation to it (see 
Shallit 2005).
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Carlsberg the brewery, and Tata the Indian conglomerate and owner of  Jaguar Land 
Rover. All of  these have one thing in common: they are all owned by industrial 
foundations.
Those industrial foundations devote their profits to investing in their businesses 
and giving any surplus to charity. But the primary purpose of the industrial  foundations 
is to ensure that the companies below them, such as Bosch and Carlsberg, abide by 
their purposes, principles and values as laid down by their founders. If  they fail to do 
so, then it is the boards of the foundations that take responsibility for this.
And herein lies the germ of understanding of how one goes from good intention 
to commitment. What defines these successful and enlightened corporations is a 
 combination of clearly defined purpose, stable and supportive ownership and 
 accountability of boards and directors to the fulfilment of that objective. It is the 
translation of the entrepreneurship of the founders into a legacy that is of lasting 
value to humanity. Not only is it then a worthy sentiment, it is a commercial 
 commitment. And, as Figure 5 shows, industrial foundation firms survive much  longer 
than equivalent other firms. While most firms die within 20 years, most foundation 
firms survive for at least 60 years.
What such enlightened corporations do is to deliver on their stated purpose by 
balancing and integrating the six different components of capital that constitute 
 business and economic activity—human capital (employees and producers), 
 intellectual capital (our knowledge and understanding), material capital (our  buildings 
and machinery), natural capital (our environment, land and nature), social capital 
(our public goods and social infrastructure) and financial capital (equity and debt).
Figure 5. Survival probability of industrial foundation and other firms:  Kaplan Meir survival curves. 
(Source: Børsting, et al. 2016.)
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This balance has changed over time. In its first and second ages, the corporation 
was a public enterprise producing social capital in the form of canals and railways, in 
its third age it created material capital in the form of manufacturing industry, in its 
fourth age human capital in the service firm, in its fifth age increasingly financial 
 capital in the transnational corporation, and intellectual capital in its sixth age.
There is one form of capital that the corporation has not produced at all to date 
and which, on the contrary, it has consumed voraciously, and that is natural capital. 
One of the reasons why we stand on the precipice of environmental disaster is its 
 failure to do so. It is not the only failure because in transitioning to financial and 
 intellectual capital we have lost the social capital that originally defined the corporate 
charter. The preoccupation with financial capital has led to the destruction of social 
capital on a massive scale.
What is required is for corporations to balance their production and usage of 
 different types of capital. They need to produce balance sheets that account for the 
human, intellectual, natural and social capital as well as their material and financial 
capital. They should record their production of these assets and their usage and 
abusage in their balance sheets. They should report their net worth in relation to all of 
them and not just their financial and material capital.
To achieve this, company law should be reformed to require corporations to 
 articulate their purposes, to redefine the fiduciary responsibility of the board of 
 directors to be not just to its members but also to the delivery of the stated purpose of 
the corporation, to produce accounts that measure its performance in so doing and to 
implement incentive arrangements that reflect the purposes of the corporation. The 
directors should thereby be accountable both to their members and to those in whose 
interests the corporation is being run.
This is hardly a revolution—capitalism not only survives but flourishes—but its 
effect will be profound. It is a private contractual solution to the provision of  corporate 
commitment that does not rely on either public ownership or public law. It has a close 
parallel in existing corporate law.
One of the most innovative developments of the last 10 years has been the 
 emergence of the public benefit corporation in the US. This has swept across 28 states 
in the US, most significantly of all Delaware. The public benefit corporation is a 
 company that has a stated public purpose alongside its commercial objectives. These 
are enshrined in its charter or its articles of association. What gives it teeth is that the 
board of directors have a fiduciary responsibility to uphold those public purposes and 
if  they fail to do so, then the shareholders can seek injunctive relief  to prevent them 
abusing the corporation’s purposes.
Where it is potentially particularly powerful is in relation to the commanding 
heights of the economy—our banks, utilities, systemically important institutions, 
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health service providers and corporations with significant market power. Take, for 
example, our banks and utilities such as our energy, telecoms, transport and water 
companies. At the moment we have just one instrument for aligning their interests 
with those of society and the public they are supposed to serve—regulation. But, as 
commercial organisations whose primary purpose is to make money for their 
 shareholders, these corporations’ interests are diametrically opposed to those of the 
regulators who act as custodians of the public interest. As a consequence, they do 
whatever they can to avoid regulation and to turn regulation to a competitive  advantage 
that deters entry of new firms.
That is why regulation has been such a failure. But convert banks and utilities into 
public benefit corporations and make their licence conditions part of their public 
 purpose, then the fiduciary duty of the directors is no longer to avoid regulation to the 
benefit of their members but to promote their regulatory requirements as part of their 
corporate charters.
Of course, not all corporations will be enlightened in the purposes that they adopt 
and we should impose minimum standards across all firms in terms of bribery, 
 corruption, human rights, market manipulation, market abuse and environmental 
obligations. We should not tolerate as at present that the social legislation put in place 
at the beginning of the 19th century to protect workers, through for example the 
Factory Acts in Britain, should be systematically circumvented by transnational 
 corporations contracting out supply and employing workers in parts of the world that 
do not have such social legislation. The minimum standards should apply to the 
 payment of living wages and safe and sanitary factory conditions at all stages in the 
supply chain and production process anywhere in the world.
But we can do much better than that as the founders of the industrial foundations 
have done. They have not for a variety of reasons simply handed them on to their heirs 
because they do not have them, do not trust them or do not like them. The reason why 
this is a defining moment in the life of a company is because, at this point, entrepre-
neurs have both achieved their commercial vision and accumulated their financial 
fortune. Their attention turns to their legacy and what the industrial foundation model 
offers is the potential for perpetuating it in a form where not only the name but the 
aspiration of the founder is preserved.
The John Lewis Partnership is such an organisation. It is governed by a constitution 
based on a Settlement in Trust that establishes that the company should be run for the 
benefit of its employees. But British common law has an aversion to limitations on 
transfer of property and restricted such arrangements to twenty-one years after the 
death of someone alive at the time of their creation. In this case, the relevant  person was 
the current monarch Queen Elizabeth II, so her funeral may be followed twenty-one 
years later by that of another much loved British institution, the John Lewis retail stores. 
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What will happen when Sergey Brin and Larry Page in Google and Mark 
Zuckerberg in Facebook have passed their sell-by date and passed into their solid 
 coffin state? Restricting the talent pool of potential successors to their heirs is a recipe 
for disaster, whereas, while industrial foundations may involve family members, they 
are not limited to them.
What this points to is a new form of philanthropy. Currently it can be  characterised 
as accumulate as much wealth as possible, exploiting other parties where necessary 
and then give it away as an act of penitence in the form of a charity or foundation. 
That is the history of the robber barons of the past—the Carnegies, Mellons, 
Rockefellers and Vanderbilts. This has two drawbacks—first, the creation of wealth 
involves substantial social damage in the process and, second, the wealth that is 
 accumulated is not as productively employed as it might be. Reinvest it instead in 
 productive enlightened corporations and wealth creation is aligned with and assists in 
wealth disbursement. The social injustice of staggering inequalities of wealth is 
thereby converted into sources of protection of the most vulnerable through making 
successful entrepreneurs into enlightened corporate reformers.
But how can we convince the mass of existing unregulated rather than new or 
regulated firms to adopt more enlightened policies? If  the only interest of their owners 
is in financial gain, then the purpose of these corporations will remain firmly fixed on 
financial performance. Pension funds, hedge funds and sovereign funds will engage in 
active long-term sustainable governance only if  they believe it to be in the interest of 
their beneficiaries—their pensioners, investors and citizens—but not otherwise. 
Enlightened self-interest might encourage a move in this direction as evidence mounts 
of the superior financial performance of engaged long-term sustainable investment, 
but we cannot afford to wait on this.
And we do not have to. With foundations offering an alternative form of owner-
ship, customers, employees, communities and nations will be able to determine whether 
they wish to remain at the mercy of self-interested companies or be protected by those 
who have a real commitment to them. Foundations convert current divisions created 
by concentrations of wealth into social advantages by providing the resources required 
in upholding corporate purpose.
We can make the promotion of such standards not a regulatory minimum but a 
competitive objective. We can create competition in trust through foundations 
 competing to establish higher standards of trust. They could offer any company the 
long-term enlightened shareholding that at present eludes so many stock  corporations. 
The Carlsberg foundation is part of the Danish Academy of Sciences. It could use its 
knowledge and expertise to provide trust services not just to Carlsberg but to any 
corporation.
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Cementing philanthropy with business brings purpose to the latter and process 
and professionalism to the former. But the real insight does not derive from 
 philanthropy but from business innovation. The mindful corporations at the start of 
this paper are examples of successful commercialisation of social capital in the form 
of social networks. They have devised mechanisms for making the creation of social 
capital highly profitable.
A striking example of the creation of social capital in a developing country  context 
is the emergence of mobile money in Kenya. Mobile money is the use of mobile 
phones to provide payment services. Approximately 60 per cent of the Kenyan 
 population uses mobile money products, with the result that the proportion of the 
population with access to financial services has grown from one-quarter in 2006 to 
two-thirds in 2013.10 Safaricom, the originator of the service in Kenya, found a way to 
commercialise the low-cost provision of payments services, thereby allowing a 
 substantial proportion of the unbanked of Kenya to become banked.
These are examples of forms of business innovation, not dissimilar to the techno-
logical innovations with which we are more familiar. Far from regarding the pursuit 
of social objectives as a distraction from commercial success, enlightened organisa-
tions view social innovation as a source of success. It is the origin of ideas that enhance 
both commercial and social well-being.
What is required to achieve this is diversity of corporate forms tailored to the 
 particular activities in which companies are engaged. To accommodate diversity, 
 legislation should be enabling rather than prescriptive. It should encourage 
 corporations to adopt legal structures, such as the public benefit corporation in the 
US or industrial foundation in Denmark. It should avoid regulation that restricts 
diversity, by, for example, discouraging the listing of dual-class shares on the London 
Stock Exchange or limiting the duration of settlements in trust in the UK.
PART 4—CONCLUSION
We have lost trust in the corporation—most acutely in banks but also in the willing-
ness of corporations in general to distribute their earnings fairly between those at the 
top and bottom of organisations, and with the rest of society through taxation. We 
have lost trust in corporations not to pursue profits at the expense of destroying our 
environment, natural habitats and planet.
10 Muthiora (2015).
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Re-establishing trust in corporations requires a reinvention of the corporation 
that involves redefining the fiduciary responsibilities of its directors to uphold its 
stated purpose and to entrust its controlling ownership to those who are responsible 
for ensuring that the directors satisfy their fiduciary obligations. In so doing, corpora-
tions shift from their current self-regarding to an other-regarding state where we can 
with confidence and credibility trust them.
The importance of this stems from the significance of trust in our lives. Economists 
regard trust as beneficial in reducing the costs of formal legal contracts. But in a world 
of extremely incomplete, unenforceable and unfeasible contracts, the significance of 
trust is much more than that. It is essential to allow us to survive as citizens and 
 communities in a world of intense uncertainty where we rely on others not only to 
keep to their word but also to have deep empathy and interest in our well-being.
The corporation today is inhumane. It is inhumane because we have taken humans 
and humanity out of it and replaced them with anonymous markets and shareholders 
over whom we have no control. Stephen Hawking has warned of the consequence of 
removing humans from control of science and artificial intelligence in particular, and 
thereby making us no longer masters of our own minds. We have already done that in 
the corporation by allowing markets not man to become masters of our mindful 
corporation.
Underlying this is the fact that we have systematically eradicated the humanities 
from the study of economics and business. That was not the original foundation of 
the enlightenment in emphasising rationality over religion. Adam Smith was careful 
to balance the emphasis he placed on markets in The Wealth of Nations with morality 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. But that balance has been lost in the subsequent 
250 years and ethics has been surpassed by efficiency in economics. We need to correct 
that as a matter of urgency and put humanity and the humanities back into 
business.
There is, of course, no institution in the world better placed to do that than the 
British Academy for the humanities and social sciences and I would urge it to adopt 
this as a programme of debate and research. It is urgent because, without moral 
 corporations, our economic systems will continue to collapse, our financial systems to 
fail and our environment to degrade. With it we can achieve greater levels of social 
well-being and economic prosperity than has been possible to date because ultimately 
a moral corporation is a commercially successful corporation and the competitiveness 
of nations depends on the moral fibre of its corporations.
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